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Introduction 
Pakistan has borne the brunt of an increasingly hostile international media and political rhetoric 
from prominent politicians around the world that paint Pakistan as a duplicitous, unstable country 
teetering on the brink of collapse. Pakistan has supposedly been teetering on the brink of collapse 
for many decades, however, and the doom and gloom is beginning to look a little repetitive. The 
country has seen repeated military regimes, but they have thus far not managed the entrenched 
hold over the state characteristic of places like Qaddafi's Libya or Saddam's Iraq. Zia ul Haq, 
perhaps the most notorious and brutal of these military rulers, tried to cling to power beyond his 
welcome period and was blown up for his tenacity. The excesses of the political elites are beyond 
question, though, as are the gross inequalities in the distribution of resources within the country. 
In many respects, Pakistan should be a failed state, but evidently it is not. There is a remarkable 
level of continuity and stability in the country despite all of the media reporting that reminds us 
that there are suicide bombers, violent gunmen, intolerant and violent crowds in Pakistan. The 
civil service, for all of the accusations of corruption and incompetence (much of which is 
undoubtedly true), persists in carrying out the bureaucratic functions one associates with the civil 
service. Pakistan has managed to retain a civilian, elected government since the 9th of September 
2008, despite extremely serious allegations leveled at several high ranking office holders. Despite 
evidence that the party in power (whichever party that may be) is prone to abusing its power to 
quash dissent, the opposition parties seem capable of holding in check many of the extreme 
measures that get proposed. In this article we examine some of  the reasons for this continuity and 
stability. Our goal is to understand Pakistan's capacity to maintain state institutions successfully in 
the face of the adversity and violence that have led to the catastrophic collapse of regimes in other 
parts of the world. 
Nonetheless, there are, indeed, parts of Pakistan's state that appear to have failed. Some 
peripheral regions have never really been under the control of either national or provincial state 
institutions, but have been regulated according to local social institutions, which reportedly are 
now dysfunctional. While these regions fall outside the scope of this article, we believe that part 
of the explanation for their relative lack of coherence and stability may come from the reverse of 
the phenomena with which we are concerned—the role of marriage networks in forming powerful 
political families.  In their case, the dysfunction stems from the lack of marriage networks 
binding key political players together across regions. 
Robustness and Resilience 
Cultural and political systems that survive over time demonstrate certain characteristics that allow 
them to remain recognizably the same over time while also ensuring sufficient flexibility to adapt 
to external shocks. The dynastic politics of South Asia are well known for producing political 
groups linked by descent, which effectively allow a small set of families to reproduce their 
political positions. These dynasties provide considerable robustness to the system, thus ensuring 
that, whether we look at the political landscape in 1975 or 2015, we recognize similar patterns 
and shapes in the form of the sons, and occasionally daughters, in positions of power and 
authority. The problem with systems when they are overly robust, though, is that they can be 
brittle in the event of severe shocks to the system-- something reasonably frequent in Pakistani 
politics.  
Read (2005) used data from Netsilik Inuit social organization from the 1920s to illustrate 
the importance of both resilience and robustness in any sustainable system. Beginning with a 
serious dilemma of food shortages in harsh winter environments, Read argues that Netsilik social 
relations maximized the reproducibility of the group while ensuring sufficient resilience to adapt 
to difficult times. In order to maximize the members of a group who hunted and fished (men) in 
relation to those who ate (women+men), the Netsilik developed cultural notions of personhood 
that permitted female infanticide prior to the naming of a newborn. This resulted in a marked sex 
imbalance that potentially rendered marriages more problematic because of each family's desire 
to retain the food producer (the man) in a context where there were significantly fewer women 
than men. The solution to the problem of an imbalance in the sex ratio was to practice close 
cousin marriage, so that the new couple remained close enough to their parental households to 
continue to contribute to them. In turn, this triggered problems for winter hunting, which required 
the cooperation of a large number of hunters. The potential fragmentation generated by close 
cousin marriage and residential groupings was addressed through an additional, extra-kin social 
group called Seal Partnerships. Seal Partnerships were created at the birth of a boy and defined the 
exchange relationships of seal meat for life. The partnerships ensured that during the lean months 
of winter, when a particular household may face extended periods of unsuccessful hunting trips, 
they would nevertheless be given some seal meat to survive. Thus the social organization of the 
Netsilik Inuit exhibited robust forms of kinship through close cousin marriage, which reproduced 
recognizable related households over time, but also created durable, yet flexible and resilient 
bonds between these close kinship units that maximized survivability in times of scarcity.  
Pakistani kinship, existing as it does in economically and politically diverse and contested 
contexts, unsurprisingly exhibits, like the Netsilik case, both robustness and resilience, but within 
the kinship system in their case. Strongly patrilineal rules of descent and transmission of nasl 
(roughly translated as the character or type of a person) result in strikingly successful political 
dynasties. Most of today’s prominent leaders come from politically successful families of the 
past. This fits with other models of authority and power transmission in South Asia. The network 
of sufi shrines demonstrate classic assumptions of charismatic transference from father to son and 
from master to pupil. The khilafat, or franchise system of the Chishti order of Sufism, for 
example, is based on both patrilineal descent (from the family of the Prophet), as well as 
instruction from a recognized Chishti master. Overreliance on descent, however, introduces 
potential vulnerabilities in the event of serious shifts in political power. Marital alliances are a 
way to link households in a manner similar to the links provided by descent relations. Thus, 
marital alliances incur mutual expectations of support and resource exchange. They also, to some 
extent, implicate households in one another's public reputations. So while the most important 
people affecting a household's honour, or izzat, remain those linked by common descent, 
everyone connected to the household can impact the izzat in some way. Thus, marriages outside 
unilineal descent groups not only extend political networks, they also increase the number of 
households who have a shared interest in maintaining the positive public reputations of all linked 
households. 
Systems like this vary in their level of complexity. Marriage constitutes one of the more 
interesting and fundamental cultural systems in Pakistan. Marriage follows identifiable patterns 
that legitimize and reproduce certain kinds of social relations. These social relations merge 
domestic and public spheres in ways that demonstrate both resilience (capacity to respond 
effectively to shock) as well as robustness (capacity to reliably reproduce the system across 
generations)  
 
Marriage in Pakistan 
Marriage practices in Pakistan are not uniform. There is a great deal of diversity in the strategies 
employed across different families and over time for arranging marriages.  Arranged marriages 
are frequent and there appears to be cultural consensus on the criteria used for selecting marriage 
partners. Though not an elementary kinship system in Lévi-Strauss’s (1969)  terms, there are clearly 
many more positive guidelines about who young people should marry than one would find in a 
complex system largely defined, according to Lévi-Strauss, by whom one should not marry. 
Donnan (2010:23–34) and Fischer (1994) describe marriage strategies that explicitly cite a 
preference for marriages based on similarities. Marriage partners should be very similar to each 
other, should come from the same zat or caste, have similar education levels, and their families 
should have relatively similar income levels.  They should have grown up eating the same types 
of food and listening to the same children’s stories and songs. They should share the same 
religious outlook on life, and so on. This, people will say, leads to more stable and happier 
marriages, not only for the couples, but for the extended family members who must accept the 
new spouse into their homes.  
One widespread strategy for ensuring that like marries with like is to arrange marriages 
between cousins, though they need not be within the same patrilineage (biradari). If a single 
cousin connection is good, then a double cousin connection is even better. Lyon’s host in a village 
in northern Punjab boasted of having a double first cousin connection to his wife (Lyon 2004). 
Lyon (2013) discusses the importance of cousin marriages as an inheritance strategy. He argues 
that such strategies are neither monolithic nor exclusive. He analyzed marriages from a 200 year 
time period in a single village in northern Punjab and concluded that a single landowning family
1 
                                                          
1 The English term, family, is problematic. Unfortunately, the Urdu and Punjabi equivalents are equally 
inadequate for describing the grouping with which we are concerned, namely a group of households who self-identify 
had a split marriage strategy. One part of the family tended to marry unrelated village outsiders, 
while another part appeared to prefer arranged marriages to close cousins within the village. These 
two strategies continued for more than 100 years, but then changed around the time of Pakistan’s 
independence from Britain and separation from India. These two strategies provided increase 
resilience in the face of political and economic uncertainty, but when the political landscape 
became more predictable, the strategies converged into a more cooperative and mutually 
beneficial pattern of intermarriage between previously distinct lineages. 
Elite Families 
In 1968, Dr Mahbub ul Haq, the then Chief Economist of the Planning Commission of Pakistan, 
identified 22 Pakistani families in Pakistan who controlled 66% of the industrial assets and 87% 
of the banking (Bari 2011). These families, he argued, had become both the Planning Commission 
and the Finance Ministry for the private sector (Haq 1973). In 1974, White (1974) expanded this 
number to 42 families. In a special pre-election issue of the Pakistani magazine, The Herald, Zahid 
(2013) states that the number of Pakistani dynastic families dominating electoral politics is 597.
2
 
Although the exact number of families seems to vary a bit, there does appear to be a small number 
of families who disproportionately control the bulk of the country’s industrial and financial assets. 
Many of these families are also powerful landowners, so their influence is not restricted to just 
industry and banking. Though these families include many prominent names that appear in the 
rolls of the Senate, the National Assembly, government ministries and so on, they are singled out 
largely for their apparent lack of accountability. Their sin, according to these authors, is not that 
they have monopolized elected offices, but rather that they hold most of the country’s assets. 
For the most part, the emphasis, both in Pakistan and in political science analyses, has 
been on the political and economic implications of  familial connections through descent or 
siblinghood. The Sharif brothers (Nawaz and Shahbaz) have been tremendously influential, both 
economically and politically, with children who are also active in electoral politics in Pakistan. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
as related and who exhibit the capacity for cooperation on important issues. They are also one another's most serious 
political and economic rivals. Most members of these households trace their ancestry back to a common ancestor who 
lived around the late 18th century. 
 
2 Though Zahid focussed mainly on members of elected institutions, the data were drawn from sub district, 
provincial and national levels, so they provide a useful measure of political influence in general. 
 
Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the son of the Asif Ali Zardari and the late Benazir Bhutto, the daughter 
of one of Pakistan's most famous politicians, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, is driven by an interest in 
familial political inheritance rather than simply the accumulation of wealth. The desire to create 
political dynasties is not unique to Pakistan, or indeed South Asia. Duindam’s (2016) 
examination of historical dynasties around the word suggests that while transmission of political 
power within families may be discouraged in contemporary Western Europe and North America, 
such practices are not entirely alien to any part of the world. While the lineage based transmission 
of political authority and power in Pakistani politics is unquestionably interesting and worth 
exploring further, the indirect alliances created through marriage are equally important. The 
factional divisions and rivalries are well-accounted for in a descent-centric model, but this model 
deals poorly with broader instances of cooperation that underpin initiatives in which there are 
relatively peaceful transitions between radically opposed regimes. Though descent and lineage 
connections among party politicians are of interest, we focus here, instead, on marital connections 
between individuals in order to determine the degree to which these connections cross party lines. 
The Marital Networks 
Some political families maintain marriages almost exclusively with members of their own 
biradari (lineage) and within their own political party. Even in these cases, however, there are 
always potential connections that could be formed outside the biradari and the party in the form of 
marriages with currently serving or recently retired military personnel. The armed forces in 
Pakistan, although ostensibly apolitical, must be seen as a powerful political organization. This is 
explicit during the times of military rule, but remains true during times of elected civilian 
governments as well. Some families are more avid instigators than others of cross region and caste 
marriages that help to create and consolidate province-wide political networks. One of the most 
famous of these families is the Chaudhrys of Gujrat, but they are far from unique in adopting this 
culturally meaningful tactic.  
The reason we have chosen the Chaudhrys of Gujrat to illustrate the argument is largely a 
matter of practicalities. They are one of the most successful political families in Punjab, so much 
of their genealogical and marital data are available in public records. The data used for this paper, 
for example, have all been derived from newspaper accounts of marriages and obituaries, in 
which people's fathers-in-law are frequently reported. We have examined other political families' 
marital records, but these data are more confidential and therefore from more problematic sources. 
We have the utmost respect for this family and do not present their marriage decisions as either 
deviant or corrupt in any way. 
The Chaudhrys of Gujrat 
Gujrat district lies between Lahore and Rawalpindi. Historically, it was not a major center of 
national or provincial power prior to the creation of Pakistan. Like many districts in Pakistan, it 
has been landlord dominated and elections have been marked by a sharp emphasis on biradari 
networks and broader patron client networks. This district is distinguishable by a particularly 
astute family of Jats, who have not only demonstrated considerable political acumen, but have 
proven, beyond any doubt, that marital alliances can help in the creation of cross regional and 
cross quom or caste political blocs. In the 1950s and 1960s, Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi, a former 
government official who had become a businessman, contested local elections and became a 
significant political force. Like a great many civilian politicians in Pakistan, he proved his 
credentials as an opposition politician under the military regime of Ayub Khan (1958-1968), in 
part through imprisonment. He was a minister in the caretaker government between the end of 
Yaya Khan's military government (1968-1970) and the beginning of Z. A. Bhutto's government 
(1971-1977). He continued his role as a prominent opposition politician during Bhutto's 
governance. He may possibly have gone on to play a prominent role under Zia ul Haq's military 
rule (1977-1988), but was assassinated in 1981. His brother, Chaudhry Manzoor Elahi, was 
successful in provincial electoral politics and served as a Member of the Punjab Provincial 
Assembly. His sons, the eldest of whom is Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, and his nephew, Chaudhry 
Parvez Elahi, have taken up the baton from their fathers and have played a prominent role in 
Pakistani politics since the mid 1980s. Ch. Shujaat Hussain is now a former Prime Minister of 
Pakistan and currently a Senator. Ch. Parvez Elahi is leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Q). 
The family's political success has risen and dipped over the years, but there can be no doubt that 
they remain one of the most influential political families in the country. 
The dynastic network of the Chaudhrys of Gujrat tells only part of the story, however. If 
they were truly reliant on just the obvious patrilineal descent ties, they would not be part of the 
evident province-wide political base. Similarly, if they relied primarily on biradari politics, then 
they would soon find themselves losing out against the larger biradari across other parts of 
Punjab and Pakistan (notably the Gujars, who may number as many as 30 million across 
Pakistan). The key to understanding the tremendous influence that this family has had lies, 
instead, in a careful examination of their marital alliances. 
One of Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi's daughters is married to Major Tahir Saddiq, who comes 
from a successful political family from Attock District in northern Punjab (see Figure 1). Maj. 
Tahir Saddiq's father, Sardar Sadiq Khan, and mother, Begum Sadiq, were both elected politicians 
before him. After leaving the army, he entered politics and served a number of years as Nazim 
(subdistrict leader) and as a member of the provincial assembly. His son, Zain Elahi (sometimes 
called Zain Khan), became a member of the National Assembly and their daughter, Eman 
Waseem, was an Member of the National Assembly (MNA) from Attock District from 2002-
2008. One of Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi's younger sons, Chaudhry Shafaat Hussain, is married to the 
daughter of Gul Hammed Khan Rokri, the son of Ghulam Haidar Khan Niazi, who is from a 
prominent Mianwalli District political family (see Figure 1). A third son, Chaudhry Wajahat 
Hussain, is married to the daughter of Akhtar Nawaz Khan, a former provincial minister from 
Haripur District (see Figure 1). He was, very sadly, assassinated in 2009, and, like many 
politicians from Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa (KPK) province, flirted with various political affiliations, 
including the Awami National Party. Akhtar Nawaz's brother, Gohar Nawaz Khan, is currently a 
member of the KPK provincial assembly and belongs to the Qoumi Wattan Party  
Even this small cohort illustrates the extent to which political networking has been 
achieved through marriages. The social network map in Figure 1 shows descent connections with 
directional arrowed lines (indicating downward generational transmission) and marital 
connections with bi-directional arrowed lines (rendered thicker for emphasis). All of the named 
individuals are, or have been, actively involved in electoral politics. We have intentionally not 
named individuals who have neither held nor run for office. 
 <Figure 1 here. Labels-b.jpg> 
[Caption: Figure 1 shows the significance of key marriages that join members of separate 
political families and lineages as well as the ways in which marriage can be used to consolidate 
existing political families.] 
 
In Figure 1, the obvious central node, Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi, is arguably the instigator 
of the marital network. It is his descendants who have married outside of their lineage to hitherto 
unrelated groups of politically active families in other parts of Pakistan that results in a network 
that exhibits both resilience and robustness. To the right of Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi, we see his 
father (Chaudhry Sardar Khan Warraich) with two descent lines emerging connecting both 
Chaudhry Zahoor and his brother Chaudhry Manzoor Elahi. Following the stated preferential 
marriage expectations, the children of these two brothers have married one another. Chaudhry 
Manzoor Elahi’s son, Chaudhry Pervez Elahi, married Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s daughter. 
Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s son, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, married Chaudhry Manzoor Elahi’s 
daughter. These two marriages constitute a straight reproduction of the earlier generation and 
consolidate both resources and kin identity within a single lineage. There are three other strategic 
marriages that do not conform to the pattern of close, like-for-like marriages, however. We take 
each of these in turn. 
Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s Daughter and Major Tahir Sadiq’s marriage represents not only 
a break from lineage marriage, but also from marriage within caste. Major Tahir Sadiq comes 
from a Khattar family. Khattar’s are a prominent caste in northern Punjab in Rawalpindi Division 
concentrated primarily in Attock District and around Taxila and Wah along the Grand Trunk 
Road. They were influential in the British era and received large land grants at various points in 
India’s history. One of the most notable Khattar politicians was Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan (1882-
1942), who expanded his family’s already considerable wealth into significant political power. 
Major Tahir Sadiq, is therefore part of an extremely influential familial network dating back 
several generations. We have only included his parents and his son and daughter in this graph, 
but in addition to active politicians included here, there is an extensive network of Khattar 
politicians that hold prominent positions of influence at Sub District, District and Provincial 
levels. This single marital union provides the Chaudhrys of Gujrat a strong, personal connection 
to one of the most important political networks in northern Punjab. 
The second strategic marriage that differs from the expected pattern, is between Chaudhry 
Zahoor Elahi’s second son, Chaudhry Shufaat Hussain and Gul Hameed Rokri’s daughter. Gul 
Hameed Rokri’s family caste is Niazi. The Niazis of Mianwali have produced an impressive 
number of influential politicians (including Imran Khan, though his political base is considerably 
broader than the usual lineage based politics). He is an important politician who has held a 
remarkable number of elected offices throughout his career. The marriage between his daughter 
and the Gujrati Chaudhrys represents a potentially powerful alliance of otherwise geographically 
separated networks. Moreover, his family connections to prominent politicians from other 
political parties, provides a number of useful channels for informal negotiations that might 
otherwise trigger undue attention. 
The final strategic exogamous marriage included here is Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi’s third 
son, Chaudhry Wajahat Hussain and Akhtar Nawaz Khan’s daughter. Akhtar Khan Nawaz was 
sadly assassinated in 2009, but his family have long represented one of the powerful blocs in 
Haripur District that borders KPK and Punjab. In addition to providing the Chaudhry family with 
a direct personal connection to a powerful political family from a different region and province, 
this marriage crosses political party lines. Akhtar Nawaz Khan was a member of the Awami 
National Party. His brother, Gohar Nawaz Khan, is a member of the Qaumi Watan Party. 
 
These three strategic marriages provide critical connections to remote districts of Punjab 
and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. They provide affinal connections to Attock and Mianwalli in northwest 
Punjab and to Haripur in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. They link four biradari: Jats (from Gujrat), 
Khattars (from Attock), Niazis (from Mianwalli) and Tareen (from Hazara).(see Map).  
 
<Map of northern Pakistan here- File close-up-zilla-net.jpg> 
[Caption: Map of Northern Pakistan showing the locations of the four districts Haripur, 
Attock, Mianwali and Gujrat). Through marriage, the Chaudhrys of Gujrat have created tangible 
political connections that bind each of these districts.] 
 
Not all marriages are arranged with distant political dynasties, of course. The first 
marriages discussed above joins parallel cousins. Altogether, the Chaudhry's marital networks 
serve to consolidate the dynastic connections through intra- and inter-biradari marriage. However, 
the importance of these marital connections must not be overestimated. The networks are not 
inviolable and the individuals involved are capable of disagreeing with one another. What makes 
the networks effective, though, is that there are multiple channels of communication among the 
members. In addition to the usual political meetings in which they all jointly participate, the 
networks provide informal opportunities for strategizing and coordinating political activities. 
 The same social network is shown in Figure 2 without name labels to make evident the 
pattern for the marriages making up the network shown in Figure 1. The marriages are labeled as 
Unions 1 through 6. Of these, Unions 1, 2 and 3 serve as bridging links joining unrelated clusters 
of political families. Unions 4 and 5 illustrate the repeat endogamous exchanges that are typical in 
Pakistan. These not only serve purposes of cross generational replication of lineages, they also 
reinforce bonds between siblings within a generation. Union 6 is not directly relevant for 
explaining the influence of the Gujrati Chaudhrys, but is included to reflect the extent of the 
political involvement by the members of that family. 
 <Figure 2 here. no-labels-b.jpg> 
[Caption: Figure 2: Here we have the same network with individual people’s names removed, in 
order to focus on the significance of the marital unions themselves.] 
 
Implications 
These data have two key implications. The first involves questions of legitimacy and narratives that 
authorize individuals to claim political power. The second is more logistical and pragmatic. Such 
unions provide tangible channels for communication outside reliable lineage networks. The unions 
created through marriage bind political competitors in ways that facilitate communication in a 
particularly challenging environment.  
Part of the driving force underpinning the particular configurations one finds in Pakistani political 
lineages is an aspiration for legitimacy. Pakistani politics are riddled with stories of offices or 
resources taken by force. In the rural areas, the use of force to take either brides or land is referred 
to as kabza. Kabza, however, is by consensus a negative way to assert control over others, and so 
those who engage in these tactics simultaneously develop intricate narratives to legitimize their 
use of force to achieve their goals. Controlling large tracts of land in rural areas usually requires a 
combination of actual force, in the form of loyal peasant farmers who are occasionally willing to 
arm themselves on behalf of their landlord, as well as a genealogical ties to the area and any 
disputed lands (Lyon 2013). Force, by itself, is inherently unstable and vulnerable. The same is 
true for the prizes of party electoral politics. One needs a claim that is seen as being legitimate. 
This is partly achieved through the power of oratory, but is greatly enhanced through strong 
network connections to those who have succeeded in politics in the past. Among the individuals 
included in Figure 1, the children of Major Tahir Sadiq draw their legitimacy not only from their 
father’s illustrious lineage (the Khattars) but also from their mother’s side (the Chaudhrys). The 
Gujrati Chaudhrys emerged as a political force more recently, but have been extraordinarily 
successful under successive regimes, so individuals that can combine recent national political 
authority with historically established clout clearly need not work hard to develop narratives of 
legitimacy. In Sindh, perhaps the most famous Pakistani politician of the 1960s and 1970s, Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto was undoubtedly a gifted politician, despite his tragic end, but he undoubtedly had 
added authority and influence because he came from a politically successful family. Imran Khan's 
anecdotes about his father having been present at the 1940 Lahore Conference, where the Qaid-i-
Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah became a full supporter of a separate homeland for India's 
Muslims, are not casual tales. They are assertions of legitimacy. 
Narratives of legitimacy that center on lineage are widespread, but should perhaps be 
considered incomplete. Despite a kinship system that emphasizes paternity, marriage offers a 
concrete way of establishing meaningful social relations that are not dependent on shared 
ancestry.  Within this this dynastic political landscape we find mechanisms for inclusion of those 
who lack desirable pedigree narratives. The families we have examined here, for example, 
illustrate the ways in which a relatively recent politically active family (the Chaudhrys of Gujrat) 
can form alliances with families that have been politically more active historically. We do not 
suggest that the Chaudhrys are not from a prestigious caste (Jats are certainly one of the caste 
considered more noble than many others), but the children of these cross caste marriages benefit 
from a powerful combination of narratives from distinct lineage connections.  Marriage allows 
connections across families that spread the legitimacy beyond those who, otherwise, are 
exclusively patrilineally connected (in Figure 2 these are unions 4, 5 and 6), though, as with every 
other claim for legitimacy, these claims do not go unchallenged by rivals. 
In addition to establishing legitimacy, complex marital networks bind together competitive 
participants in the political process by offering opportunities for negotiation of conflict. Marriage 
strategies exhibit both resilience and robustness. Robustness comes from preferential marriage 
patterns in which like marry like, including party affiliation. Within Pakistani marriage systems, 
resilience is ensured through a few exogamous marriages, both from lineage and party, that bridge 
party political boundaries. Intra lineage marriages, especially those between the children of 
siblings, reinforce political alliances that are in fact already supposed to be very strong. When 
siblings compete overtly with one another, the negative reputation can jeopardize anyone closely 
associated with any of the siblings. So cousin marriages do little to extend networks and therefore 
provide few, if any, new allies. Inter lineage marriages, on the other hand, offer a less coherent, but more 
flexible array of allies who can support one another in the event of turbulence or unexpected political turns. 
In the normal operations of Pakistani politics, resilience in the face of shocks is not simply a convenience, it 
is a necessity to ensure long term political survival. While this may undermine coherent party 
ideologies or practices, arguably it provides greater flexibility for crisis management. We argue 
that Pakistan is not a failed state, but is a state that must frequently deal with crisis, so using 
marriages to maximize both the group’s and the individual's capacity to adapt to changing political 
and economic circumstances is necessary for survival. 
Again the Chaudhry family provide a remarkable lesson in Pakistani political survival. 
The family has survived the assassination of its founder, and ongoing factionalism within the 
Pakistan Muslim League between the Chaudhry Shujaat ‘Wing’ and the Nawaz Sharif ‘Wing’. 
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was a prominent member of different governments and found himself 
on the ‘losing’ side on more than one occasion, but he and his family, have sustainably recovered 
from shocks that have destroyed other, less successful, political families. The proof is perhaps to 
be found in the success of the next generation. While the generation of Chaudhry Shujaat and 
Pervez Elahi are arguably retired or nearing retirement, their children have proven they can win 
elections and retain political office.  
In Levi-Strauss’ useful distinction between elementary and complex kinship systems, 
there are two opposing strategies for determining marriage partners. In the complex system, the 
choice is determined by a set of negative rules (who one must not marry). In the elementary 
system, the choice is made through positive rules (who one must marry). In Pakistan, there are 
‘soft’ rules for who one must or must not marry. In both village level marriages, as in prominent 
party political family marriages, what we find is that all of these rules are subject to contingent 
political expediency. The reproduction of preferential marriage ‘rules’ is underpinned by a 
pragmatic assessment of what ensures household survival best. Historically, that has frequently 
led to close cousin marriage, in which resources can be confined within finite group boundaries, 
however, that results in overly ‘closed’ networks that lack sufficient links to develop useful 
cooperation across lineages. As Turner found among the Ndembu (1958), despite clear and 
agreed rules that supposedly regulate marriage in societies, individuals can and often do make 
decisions that are in the best interest of the household even if the ‘rules’ might suggest a different 
set of decisions. The distinction of elementary and complex is consequently a useful typology, 
but perhaps should not be applied to real ethnographic situations too rigidly. 
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